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THE NINTH CIRCUIT GRAPPLES WITH THE ARBITRABILITY 
AND UNCONSCIONABILITY OF MMWA CLAIMS 
 
Amanda Miller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION   
In the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Section two states that arbitration agreements are 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”1 Despite this clear statutory mandate requiring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, parties constantly resist the arbitral process.  Often, parties endeavor to 
use state contract law in attempts to prevent the court from compelling arbitration as required by 
FAA § 2. To preclude arbitration, parties frequently argue that they are not bound by the 
agreement because the underlying claims lack substantive arbitrability. While arbitrability 
challenges are slowly becoming more futile,2 the former route has flourished. By applying 
unconscionability doctrine, parties often persuade the court that the terms of the arbitration 
agreement shock the conscience and are unenforceable.3 
In Kolev v. Euromotors, the Plaintiffs sought to defeat a motion to compel arbitration and 
presented the Ninth Circuit court with unconscionability and substantive inarbitrability defenses.4   
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Magnuson Moss Warrant Act (MMWA) warranty claims are not 
arbitrable and ignored the unconscionability claim.5  In Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., a 
similar case involving state statutes, the California Court of Appeal held that the arbitration 
clause was unconscionable.6 In response to the California Supreme Court granting review in 
Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit issued a sua sponte withdrawal of the Kolev opinion and will issue a 
new opinion light of the California Supreme Court decision in Sanchez, which will likely address 
unconscionability, as opposed to substantive inarbitrability. While unconscionability challenges 
                                                     
* Amanda Miller is Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
2 See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); see also 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 
1456 (2009). 
3 See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (setting out factors for unconscionability in 
arbitration agreements); see also Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable); see also Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding that a home purchasers’ warranty agreement had adhesive arbitration provisions that involved surprise, 
violated the purchasers’ reasonable expectations and could not be severed); see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. 
Jackson 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that unconscionability/enforceability was a decision for the arbitrator); see 
also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 118462, at *46, 2011 WL 4454913, at *4 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011) (“Concepcion did not completely do away with unconscionability as a defense to the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements under the FAA.”). 
4 Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn and vacated by 2012 
WL 1194177, ___F.3d___ (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
5 Id. 
6 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), vacated and review granted 
by 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 19 (Cal. 2012). 
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have survived and seem to thrive post-AT&T Mobility,7 it is clear that challenging motions to 
compel on arbitrability grounds is fruitless.  
II.  BACKGROUND  
The courts have established a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements and require 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate according to their terms.8  Despite this policy of favoring 
the arbitral, the courts were originally hesitant to arbitrate certain statutory claims.9  
In Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler, the Court held that international arbitrators have authority 
to rule upon statutory claims that arose in the performance of an international contract.10 When 
initially rendered, the holding was limited to international commercial arbitration matters.  The 
courts later began to ignore the international specificity of the holding and integrated the policy of 
arbitrating statutory claims into domestic law. Precedent prohibiting domestic recourse to 
arbitration of certain statutory claims was reversed.11  
The Supreme Court has also promulgated a policy of enforcing agreements to arbitrate 
even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA's mandate has been 
“overridden by a contrary congressional command.”12 In Kolev, the Ninth Circuit court held that 
Congress delegated MMWA rule-making authority to the FTC, who interpreted the statute’s 
intent to preclude mandatory and binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses.13 This decision was 
controversial, as the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts have both held that the MMWA does not 
preclude arbitration of MMWA warranty claims.14 The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court was 
vacated, and a new opinion will be rendered after the California State Supreme Court issues an 
opinion in Sanchez, which addresses unconscionability of arbitration clauses.  
While arbitration contracts are binding, Courts may sometimes hold that these 
agreements are unenforceable when the arbitration clause is unduly oppressive and 
unconscionable.15 In Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., the court held that oppression may exist and an 
arbitration provision in a sales contract can be procedurally unconscionable when “[the buyer] 
                                                     
7 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that California state contract law deeming 
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements unenforceable, is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act). 
8 See Moses H Cone v. Mercury, 461 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that courts should resolve any doubts about 
arbitrability in favor of arbitration); see also Dean Witter v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); see also Stolt-Nielsen v. 
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774-75 (2010).  
9 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987) (“[T]he mistrust of arbitration that 
formed the basis for the Wilko [v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),] … is difficult to square with the assessment of 
arbitration that has prevailed since that time.”). 
10 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that international 
arbitrators have authority to rule on statutory claims in international contracts). 
11 See Shearson, 482 U.S. at 242; see also 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (holding that there is no 
subject matter inarbitrability of civil rights claims as long as the agreement clearly submits disputes to arbitration); 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
12 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (holding that federal statutory claims are 
arbitrable unless express congressional command says otherwise).  
13 Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011). 
14 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Davis v. S. Energy Homes, 
Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002). 
15 See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (setting out factors for unconscionability in 
arbitration agreements). 
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asserts the Contract was presented to him on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis, ... and he did not have an 
opportunity for meaningful negotiation…No one pointed out the Arbitration Clause or discussed 
it with [the buyer] at any time ….”16 In Sanchez, the California Court of Appeal held that the 
arbitration clause was unconscionable because the provision was adhesive, involved oppression 
and surprise, and contained one-sided terms that favored the car dealer to the detriment of the 
buyer.17 While the Kolev court chose not to address the unconscionability claims in their first 
opinion, they may discuss the Plaintiffs unconscionability claims once the California Supreme 
Court renders an opinion in Sanchez.18 
III.  COURT’S ANALYSIS  
In Kolev v. Euromotors West, Diana Kolev brought suit against Euromotors West/The 
Auto Gallery, Motorcars West LLC (“the Dealership”) and Porsche Cars North America 
(“Porsche”), when the pre-owned automobile she bought from the Dealership developed serious 
mechanical issues during the warranty period.19 The Dealership refused to honor her warranty 
claim and Kolev alleged breach of implied and express warranties under the MMWA, breach of 
contract, and contract unconscionability.20   
The sales contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which the District Court 
enforced when the Dealership made a motion to compel arbitration.21 The arbitration resulted in 
an arbitral award favoring the Dealership.22 Kolev appealed, arguing that the MMWA barred 
binding arbitration of her warranty claims. Kolev maintained that while the MMWA did not 
specifically address arbitration, Congress delegated MMWA rulemaking authority to the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”).23  Kolev claimed that the FTC construed the MMWA to bar pre-
dispute mandatory binding arbitration clauses in warranty agreements, and as prohibiting 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in claims brought under the MMWA.24 
The Ninth Circuit originally held that MMWA warranty claims were not subject to 
compulsory arbitration.25 While the courts in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both held that 
the MMWA does not preclude arbitration of warranty claims,26 the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
finding that Congress delegated MMWA rule-making authority to the FTC, who interpreted the 
statute’s intent to preclude mandatory and binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses.27  Because they 
                                                     
16 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the arbitration clause 
was procedurally unconscionable).  
17 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 19, 22-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
18 Kolev v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 2012 WL 1194177 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
19 Kolev v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011). 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Davis v. Southern Energy 
Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 945 (2003) (holding that MMWA warranty disputes 
are not precluded from arbitration). 
27 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1030. 
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found warranty issues under the MMWA statutorily inarbitrable, the court decided it was 
unnecessary to address the unconscionability claims.28 The Ninth Circuit recently withdrew their 
opinion for Kolev, and vacated the submission of the case, pending the issuance of a decision by 
the California Supreme Court in Sanchez.29  
In Sanchez, a consumer filed a class action claim against a car dealership, alleging 
violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA),30 the Automobile Sales Finance Act 
(ASFA),31 the Unfair Competition Law (UCL),32 the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act 
(Song–Beverly Act),33 and the California Tire Recycling Act (Tire Recycling Act).34 The 
dealership then filed a motion to compel arbitration.35 The California Court of Appeal held that 
the arbitration clause in a car dealership contract was both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable, and the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration.36  The Supreme Court of California granted the Defendant’s petition for review. This 
comment will focus on the issues decided in both the Federal and the State courts, and the effect 
the California Supreme Court decision will have on Kolev.37  
A. In Kolev, the Ninth Circuit held that Congressional Intent Precluded Binding 
Arbitration Clauses in MMWA Warranty Agreements 
The court stated that traditional tools of statutory construction were used to determine 
whether Congress expressed clear intent on the issue of arbitration clauses in the MMWA.38 The 
court found that while the MMWA did not specifically address binding arbitration agreements, 
Congress expressly delegated authority to the FTC to make rules regarding informal dispute 
settlement procedures for warranty agreements.39 The FTC stated in Rule 703 that, “[d]ecisions of 
[any] Mechanism shall not be legally binding on any person.”40  Rule 703 also stated that if a 
consumer is dissatisfied with a Mechanism’s holding or a warrantor’s actions, then legal remedies 
may be pursued.41 The FTC concluded that any written warranty containing binding, non-judicial 
remedies was prohibited.42 
                                                     
28 Id. at 1031.  
29 Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 2012 WL 1194177 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
30 CIV.CODE, §§ 1750–1784. 
31 CIV.CODE, §§ 2981–2984.6. 
32 BUS. & PROF.CODE, §§ 17200–17210. 
33 CIV.CODE, §§ 1790–1795.8. 
34 CA PUB RES D. 30, Pt. 3, Ch. 17 §§ 42860–95; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 
22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 22–23. 
37 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 2012 WL 1159303 (Cal. 2012). 
38 Id. at 2.  
39 Id. 
40 See 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j); see also Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1025. 
41 See 16 C.F.R. § 703.5 (g). 
42 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1026. 
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1. The Court Interpreted Rule 703 to Preclude Arbitration Clause in 
Warranty Agreements. 
The court provided three reasons why the interpretation precluding pre-dispute 
mandatory binding arbitration was a reasonable interpretation of the MMWA.43 First, the court 
stated that Rule 703 implemented congressional intent, evidenced by a House Subcommittee Staff 
Report that stated “[c]ongressional intent was that the decisions of Section 110 Mechanisms not 
be legally binding.”44 Second, the court stated that the FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA, 
barring pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration, advanced the statute’s purpose of protecting 
consumers from adhesive involuntary agreements.45 Third, the court stated that FTC regulations 
represented a longstanding and consistent interpretation of the statute; therefore it should have 
been accorded deference.46 
The court referenced the FTC’s 1999 statement as evidence that the Commission deemed 
the ability of warrantors to require consumers to submit to binding arbitration as contrary to 
Congress’s intent.47 The court interpreted that statement as implying that a mechanism could not 
be legally binding, as it would bar later court action.48  
2. The Ninth Circuit Reasoning of How the Federal Policy Favoring 
Arbitration did not Render the FTC’s Interpretation of the MMWA 
Unreasonable. 
a. Congressional intent was clear and the MMWA rebutted the 
Federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements. 
The Ninth Circuit cited Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, stating that the FAA 
mandate to enforce arbitration agreements may be overridden by congressional command.49 The 
court pointed out that the FAA was enacted fifty-one years prior to the enactment of the MMWA 
and later-enacted statutes, which are more specific, should be given greater deference than older, 
more general statutes.50 
The court expressly disagreed with holdings of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which 
found that the MMWA did not overcome the FAA’s presumption to enforce arbitration 
agreements.51 The court stated that the FTC has reaffirmed its interpretation of the MMWA 
                                                     
43 Id. at 1027–28. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1028–29. 
48 Id. 
49 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable under pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and customers could effectively 
vindicate their RICO claim against broker in arbitral forum). 
50 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1029. 
51 Id. at 1030. 
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prohibiting binding, non-judicial arbitration, even after McMahon established a policy favoring 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.52   
b. The MMWA was different from every other federal statute that the 
Supreme Court has found unable to rebut the FAA’s pro-
arbitration presumption. 
In the past, the Supreme Court has found no statute to meet the standard for rebutting the 
FAA’s policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.53 The court stated that the MMWA is unlike 
all the previously examined statutes in four ways. First, none of the other statutes had an 
authorized agency that interpreted the statute to prohibit pre-dispute mandatory binding 
arbitration.54 Second, in the past, Congress has never discussed informal, non-judicial remedies 
and barred binding procedures such as mandatory arbitration, as it did with the MMWA.55 Third, 
only in the MMWA has Congress explicitly preserved the consumer’s right to pursue claims in 
civil court.56 Finally, the MMWA is the only statute with the stated purpose of protecting 
consumers by prohibiting vendors from imposing binding, non-judicial remedies.57 The court 
pointed out that this differed from the FAA’s policy of expediting disputes without regard to the 
interests of consumers and referenced AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.58 
c. The Dissenting Opinion Finding how the MMWA did not Prevent 
Parties from Agreeing to Binding Arbitration as a Remedy to 
Warranty Disputes. 
Judge Smith began his dissent by pointing out that the majority mistakenly confused 
“Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures,”(IDSM) or “Mechanisms” which were discussed under 
the MMWA, with alternative dispute resolution remedies adopted in private contracts.59 Judge 
Smith stated that arbitration was not a Mechanism, and the FTC acknowledged that private 
parties were free to agree to some alternative to Mechanisms, if they deemed it more 
appropriate.60 Judge Smith further argued that “Mechanism” is a narrowly defined legal term, 
which refers to only IDSMs authorized by the MMWA.61 A binding arbitration remedy is not an 
IDSM because it is an alternative to litigation as opposed to a “pre-requisite” to litigation.62 As 
                                                     
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1031; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that class action 
waivers were acceptable in arbitration agreements, as efficiency is goal of arbitration, and contracts of adhesion are 
permissible).  
59 Id. at 1032. 
60 Id.at 1033.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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binding arbitration clauses are not included in the category of IDSMs, the FTC lacks authority to 
regulate them. 
The dissent further found that the majority’s holding banning binding arbitration in all 
warranty disputes was unsupported by the language of the statute, administrative rules, FTC 
opinions and judicial authority.63 
In addition, Judge Smith argued that the FAA established a federal policy that favored the 
enforcement of arbitration contracts; therefore, any FTC regulations that prohibited binding 
arbitration by warranty dispute resolution procedure would be unreasonable.64 Judge Smith stated 
that the FAA’s mandate could only be overridden by contrary congressional command.65 The 
party opposing arbitration carries the burden of proving that Congress intended to create an 
exception to the FAA.66  Judge Smith concluded his dissent by stating, “[t]he FTC’s ban on 
arbitration cannot reasonably be read to apply to anything other than a MMWA ‘Mechanism’.  
Even if it could, this view would be incompatible with the clear federal policy favoring arbitration 
under the Arbitration Act.”67 
B. In Sanchez, the California Court of Appeal held that the Sales Contract Signed 
was unconscionable, and the Trial Court Correctly Refused to Compel 
Arbitration 
In Sanchez, the Plaintiff filed this class action against a car dealer, alleging violations of 
several state statutes, including the CLRA, ASFA, UCL, Song–Beverly Act, and the Tire 
Recycling Act.68 The Dealer filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the 
sales contract, which also contained a class action waiver.69 The arbitration provision in the sales 
contract stated that if the class action waiver was declared unenforceable, “the entire arbitration 
provision was not to be enforced. Pursuant to this ‘poison pill’ clause, the Trial Court denied the 
petition to compel arbitration.”70  
The Dealer appealed.  The California Court of Appeal held that the arbitration provision 
was unconscionable because it was adhesive (involving oppression and surprise), and contained 
harsh one-sided terms that favor the Dealer.71 Because the provision was permeated by 
unconscionability, the court determined it was unenforceable regardless of the validity of the 
class action waiver.72 
 
                                                     
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1036. 
65 Id. 
66 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
67 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1036. 
68 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 24. 
72 Id. at 22–23. 
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1. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion found to be inapplicable  
The California Court of Appeal stated that Concepcion, “does not preclude the 
application of the unconscionability doctrine to determine whether an arbitration provision is 
unenforceable.”73 Concepcion overruled Discover Bank, which stated that: class-action waivers in 
adhesive arbitration agreements are unconscionable under California law and should not be 
enforced.74 The court in Concepcion held that “[r]equiring the availability of class-wide 
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.”75  
The FAA permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”76 This savings clause 
permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by typical contract defenses, such 
unconscionability, but not by defenses that apply solely to arbitration.77 In Rent–A–Center v. 
Jackson, the Court held that the arbitrator should decide whether the agreement was 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.78 The Sanchez court held that Concepcion is 
inapplicable because the parties are addressing unconscionability claims and not the 
enforceability of a class action waiver that is inconsistent with the FAA.79 
2. The arbitration provision satisfied both elements of procedural 
unconscionability: oppression and surprise   
The procedural element of unconscionability focuses on two factors: oppression and 
surprise.80 “Oppression” occurs when there is an inequality of bargaining power, and no real 
negotiation occurs.81 When the supposedly-agreed-upon terms of the contract are hidden by the 
party seeking to enforce the disputed terms, “surprise” exists.82 
In Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., the court found the arbitration provision to be 
oppressive.83 The facts in Sanchez are similar to those in Gutierrez in that the buyer asserted the 
contract was presented on a “take it or leave it” basis, there was no opportunity for meaningful 
negotiation, the buyer had no opportunity to read the contract prior to signing it, and no one 
                                                     
73 Id. at 28. 
74 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (holding that class action waivers were 
acceptable in arbitration agreements, and not necessarily unconscionable). 
75 Id. 
76 9 U.S.C § 2. 
77 Sanchez at 29; see also Concepcion at 1746; see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation (S.D. Fla. 
2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 118462, at *46, 2011 WL 4454913, at *4 (“Concepcion did not completely do away with 
unconscionability as a defense to the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA.”). 
78 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that unconscionability/enforceability 
was a decision for the arbitrator). 
79 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 29. 
80 Id. at 30; see also Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a home purchasers’ 
warranty agreement had adhesive arbitration provisions that involved surprise, violated the purchasers’ reasonable 
expectations and could not be severed). 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a similar arbitration 
clause was procedurally unconscionable).  
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pointed out the Arbitration Clause or discussed it with the buyer.84 Additionally, surprise exists 
when the Arbitration Clause was hidden in the lengthy form contract.85 In Sanchez, the arbitration 
clause was found at the end of the contract, after the last signature, making it unnoticeable to the 
buyer who was not given time to read the contract.86  
The court held that as the Plaintiff demonstrated surprise in addition to oppression, the 
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable.87 While Valencia argued that the clause 
lacked procedural unconscionability because Sanchez had the opportunity to buy a car elsewhere, 
the court cites Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, stating “courts are not obligated to enforce highly unfair 
provisions that undermine important public policies simply because there is some degree of 
consumer choice in the market.”88  Additionally, the California Court of Appeal has held that the 
availability in the marketplace of a substitute alone is unable defeat a claim of procedural 
unconscionability.89 
3. The arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable  
Enforcement of an arbitration clause may only be denied if it is also substantively 
unreasonable.90 Substantive unconscionability exists when the provision is overly harsh or one-
sided, falls outside reasonable expectations, or is unduly oppressive.91 The court held that four 
clauses in the arbitration provision were substantively unconscionable: 
First, a party who loses before the single arbitrator may appeal to a 
panel of three arbitrators if the award exceeds $100,000. Second, an 
appeal is permitted if the award includes injunctive relief. Third, the 
appealing party must pay, in advance, “the filing fee and other 
arbitration costs subject to a final determination by the arbitrators of a 
fair apportionment of costs.” Fourth, the provision exempts 
repossession from arbitration while requiring that a request for 
injunctive relief be submitted to arbitration.92  
The court stated that while these provisions may appear neutral on their face, they have 
the effect of placing an unduly oppressive burden on the buyer.93 
                                                     
84 Id.; see also Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 30. 
85 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.; see also Gatton v. T–Mobile USA, Inc. 585, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344  (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the 
adhesive nature of the agreement created a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability, and when combined with a 
high degree of substantive unconscionability, as existed with the class-wide arbitration waiver, was sufficient to rule 
the provision unenforceable). 
89 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31; see also Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (stating that other opportunities, alone, is insufficient to defeat a procedural unconscionability claim).  
90 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 32. 
91 Id. 
92 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 33. 
93 Id. 
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4. The court has authority to void the entire arbitration provision, as it is 
permeated by unconscionability that cannot be removed through 
severance restriction  
The trial court has discretion to refuse enforcement an entire agreement or clause if it is 
‘permeated’ by unconscionability.94 An arbitration clause may be considered permeated by 
unconscionability if it contains more than one unlawful provision.95 Courts should also consider 
whether the interests of justice would be furthered by severance of the unconscionable 
provisions.96  
The California Court of Appeal cites Armendariz, stating that Courts lack the authority to 
reform contracts.97 When severance or restriction is inadequate, and reformation of an arbitral 
clause is needed to remove the unconscionable taint from the provision, it must void the entire 
arbitration clause.98 
The court in Sanchez held that the arbitration provision was procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable.99 Because the provision was permeated by unconscionability that 
cannot be removed through severance or restriction, the trial court properly denied the motion to 
compel arbitration.100 
 
C. The California Supreme Court Granted Review of Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit’s 
Opinion in Kolev was withdrawn, and submission of the case is vacated 
Pending the issuance of a Decision in Sanchez 
 
The California Supreme Court granted Valencia’s petition for review.101 In response to 
this, the Ninth Circuit withdrew their opinion for Kolev, stating that it may not be cited as 
precedent.102 The Ninth Circuit stated that submission of the Kolev is vacated pending the 
issuance of a decision by the California Supreme Court in Sanchez.103 
                                                     
94 CIV.CODE, § 1670.5(a). 
95 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 40; see also Lhotka v. Geographic Expeditions, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2010) (holding that when an agreement is so permeated by unconscionability, severances is improper). 
96 Id. 
97 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 41; see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 
2000) (stating that Civil Code § 1670.5 and arbitration statutes do not authorize reformation of arbitration clauses by 
augmentation, and Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2 authorizes the court to refuse arbitration if grounds for revocation 
exist, not to reform the agreement to make it lawful). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 2012 WL 1159303 (Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). 
102 Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 2012 WL 1194177 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012); (citing Carver v. 
Lehman, 558 F.3d 869, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding a panel may withdraw an opinion sua sponte before the 
mandate issues)). 
103 Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 2012 WL 1194177 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2012). 
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IV.   SIGNIFICANCE  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to withdraw its opinion for Kolev is significant, especially 
considering the fact that they are withholding a replacement opinion until the California Supreme 
Court reaches a decision in Sanchez. At first glance, these two cases appear to be about 
completely different issues.  While Kolev addresses statutory inarbitrability, Sanchez involves 
voidance of arbitration clauses due to rampant unconscionability.  
While the Plaintiffs in Kolev did bring an unconscionability challenge, the Ninth Circuit 
chose not to address this, and instead rendered a controversial opinion regarding the arbitrability 
of all MMWA warranty claims. This opinion was significant because it contradicted statutory 
inarbitrability trends,104 and the court held that the MMWA prohibited the enforcement of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses.105  This decision directly contrasted with holdings from 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts,106 and could have decreased the adjudicatory efficiency of 
arbitration as a whole. 
In addition, the original holding in Kolev undermined FAA Section two. FAA Section 
two creates a federal right to arbitration, maintaining that arbitration agreements are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable.”107 By finding statutory inarbitrability in MMWA warranty 
disputes, the court eliminated the simplicity of the arbitral process, and transformed it into a 
litigious and unworkable system, which could lead to its deterioration as an efficient alternative to 
the court system.108   
Because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Kolev was so controversial, its withdrawal could 
be motivated by pressures to conform to the established policy favoring arbitration.109 While 
statutory inarbitrability grounds have no successful precedence in attacking motions to compel 
arbitration, the courts are more willing to entertain the theory of unconscionability. If the 
California Supreme Court affirms the California Court of Appeal’s decision that Concepcion was 
inapplicable, and the Trial Court was correct in voiding the arbitration clause in Sanchez, the 
Ninth Circuit may release a new opinion addressing Kolev’s previously ignored unconscionability 
claims and exclude any holding regarding the arbitrability of MMWA warranty disputes. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has established a strong policy favoring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.110 The Ninth Circuit Court’s holding in Kolev proved to be contradictory 
                                                     
104 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that 
international arbitrators have authority to rule on statutory claims in international contracts). 
105 Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011). 
106 Id.; see also Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
arbitration of the MMWA was not inconsistent with the statutory purposes of the MMWA and compelling arbitration 
of MMWA claims was consistent with FAA Section two’s policy of favoring arbitration); see also Davis v. Southern 
Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that the Supreme Court had consistently upheld 
arbitration in consumer protection claims, and the FAA did not conflict with the legislative purpose of the MMWA). 
107 See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
108 See Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031. 
109 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating that courts 
should resolve any doubts about arbitrability in favor of arbitration). 
110 Id. 
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to extensive precedence, as the Courts have found no statute that exhibited congressional intent 
clearly and unambiguously enough to preclude arbitration. 
In addition to contravening the federal policy favoring arbitration,111 this court’s holding 
directly contradicts Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Court holdings.112 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
both found that the arbitration of warranty claims was consistent with the statutory purpose of the 
MMWA, and followed the federal policy of favoring arbitration.113 These courts also held that 
arbitration of MMWA claims was a fair remedy for consumers, and as the Supreme Court had 
consistently upheld arbitration in consumer protection claims, the FAA did not conflict with the 
legislative purpose of the MMWA.114  
Despite this glaring precedence, the Ninth Circuit is clearly resisting arbitration.  The 
withdrawal of the Kolev opinion should not be looked at as a change of heart on behalf of the 
Ninth Circuit, but instead an attempt to find a savvier means of avoiding arbitration. While 
attacking motions to compel arbitration on substantive inarbitrability grounds is not viable, 
unconscionability attacks pose a more amorphous standard. The courts are more willing to void 
arbitration clauses due to unconscionability, as it is a standard contract defense.   This poses a 
potential issue for arbitration. If the Ninth Circuit continues to seek creative ways to bypass 
federal policy, precedence, and the FAA, holding against arbitration, it would decrease the 
efficiency of the entire arbitral system. 
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